The most annoying thing is holidays. Originally, I was unemployed, and mixing in Web3 means every day feels like a holiday. But when Mid-Autumn Festival, National Day, and other holidays come around, all my relatives and friends have time off and want to gather. That's the most exhausting part— a bunch of people you barely see all year get together and don't know what to say, pretending to be close, racking your brain to find something to talk about. Then if you accidentally say the wrong thing, you upset someone and they hold a grudge. It's really damn tiring. After one gathering, you rush to the next, turning me into a full-time office worker 😅

Still need to be cautious. If the exact cause of the theft is not found, once withdrawals are reopened, hackers might rush in even before users can withdraw, and the situation will be completely out of control. Being forced to close withdrawals again would deal an even bigger blow to the reputation! Bitget's August 2026 Protection Fund report released on September 14 shows that the fund's highest valuation that month was $441 million, the lowest was $345 million, and the average was $382 million. Just now, Bitget's CEO posted that the stolen funds have been revised to $387.5 million! So the situation is severe and must not be taken lightly.

#USDD's Mid-Autumn gift box🎁 surprisingly includes a stylish camping stove with a foldable stand. Take the stove out for a picnic during Mid-Autumn, enjoy your meal while admiring the moon, and casually figure out how to get rich — this is how a festival should be celebrated 😊 There are also exquisite mooncakes, full of heartfelt wishes 😻, really grateful to @usddio_cn @USDDecentralize $USDD has always been steady and reliable, and the Smart Allocator's yield strategy is also very attractive! 🚀 Happy Mid-Autumn Festival! 🌕

Bitget hacked! The attacker has converted most of the stolen funds on the EVM chain into 67,982 ETH, worth approximately $183 million On September 25, according to Lookonchain monitoring, Bitget was hacked, with about $351.6 million in assets stolen. The hacker has converted most of the stolen funds on the EVM chain into 67,982 ETH, valued at about $183 million. On-chain monitoring shows about $180 million to $183 million in assets transferred out from multiple Bitget-tagged addresses, involving ETH, BNB, AVAX, USDT0, USDC, USDT, and XAUT assets. After funds were consolidated into a main address, they were then dispersed to at least 6 addresses. Among them, a newly created address used 19.67 million USDT0 from Bitget's hot wallet to buy 7,111 ETH within about 6 minutes via UniswapX and 1inch Fusion, with some transaction prices about 5% higher than the spot market. Bitget CEO Gracy Chen has held a public live broadcast regarding this incident, but so far, the official has not released a written version of the new investigation conclusions. $ZEC

After watching this video, I realized how difficult the New Concept Composition Contest really is! Out of hundreds of thousands of participants, only 2 remain! Sun Yuchen won the first prize in the 9th National New Concept Composition Contest, which granted him a 20-point admission score reduction for Peking University’s independent enrollment. His total score in the college entrance exam was 650 points. Honestly, even without this 20-point reduction, his score was already beyond the reach of most people. If not Peking University, he could have easily chosen any other 985 university #TRONEcostar

Employee loans to buy shares, the boss's bet explodes, who is the victim in Xibei's business tragedy? Xibei was once a benchmark in the catering industry in many people's eyes. Waiting in line for two hours to eat a meal, "order with your eyes closed, every dish is delicious," these labels accompanied it for many years. At that time, few would have thought that this catering company, which owned 400 directly operated stores and was once valued at 10 billion yuan, would one day fall into difficulties such as cash flow pressure, failed IPO, valuation shrinkage, and employee interest damage. Many attribute Xibei's current problems to Luo Yonghao's public questioning, while others believe Luo Yonghao merely exposed a long-standing issue earlier. Watching the entire event from start to finish reveals that the situation is far more complex than an online controversy. Luo Yonghao may have ignited public opinion, but what truly brought Xibei to this point is the cumulative result of a series of business decisions over the past few years. The story begins in 2020. The sudden outbreak of the pandemic dealt a huge blow to the catering industry. At that time, Xibei had 400 directly operated stores, many of which suspended operations, but rent, labor, and supply chain costs remained. Jia Guolong publicly stated that, based on the cash flow situation then, the company's funds would not last more than three months. For a rapidly expanding direct-sale catering company, this moment exposed a harsh reality: the larger the scale, the higher the fixed costs, and the less room for adjustment in emergencies. Before the pandemic, Xibei grew continuously through store expansion, but the pandemic made Jia Guolong realize that relying solely on catering operations made it difficult to withstand major risks. Therefore, Xibei began seeking capital support. This is a choice many companies face during rapid growth. When a company lacks funds, it hopes capital can help expand scale; but once capital enters, it brings new demands, including growth speed, profit targets, IPO plans, and investment returns. Capital solved short-term funding issues but also changed the company's development direction. Xibei's later changes are closely related to its path toward capitalization. Before the pandemic, Jia Guolong had stated that Xibei was not considering going public. After the pandemic, his attitude changed, and he began to accept the possibility of entering the capital market. Subsequently, Xibei raised funds and formed performance targets and IPO expectations with investors. From this stage, Xibei's problem was no longer just "how to run a good restaurant," but "how to become a company that meets capital market expectations." These two goals are sometimes not fully aligned. To gain capital recognition, catering companies need standardization, scalability, and rapid replication capabilities. Thus, central kitchens, supply chain systems, and product standardization were gradually strengthened. These methods themselves are not wrong; they improve efficiency and help expand scale. But the problem is that as companies focus more on efficiency and replication, consumers become increasingly sensitive to changes in price, experience, and quality. Xibei's greatest competitive advantage was consumer trust. Many were willing to pay higher prices because they believed it offered better products and experiences. Once consumers feel prices rise without a corresponding improvement in experience, the original relationship built between brand and consumer changes. By 2025, Xibei reached a critical stage for its IPO. Stability was most needed at this stage. However, Luo Yonghao's public questioning plunged Xibei into huge public pressure. Issues about pre-made dishes, prices, and product experience sparked extensive discussion. For Xibei, this was not an ordinary consumer complaint but a major public opinion shock at a critical capital market juncture. Choosing to quickly admit problems and adjust meant facing external reevaluation of the product model. Choosing to respond and fight back meant risking further escalation of consumer emotions. Xibei chose the latter. The company then opened its kitchen, publicly responded to doubts, and took measures to prove it had no problems. But business communication has a reality: explanations to consumers do not necessarily restore trust. Consumers care not about what the company says but whether their past experience has changed. After this controversy, Xibei's capital expectations were affected. The previously focused 10 billion yuan valuation dropped significantly, with reports showing a decline from 10 billion to about 2.5 billion yuan, then further down to less than 1.5 billion yuan. The IPO plan was impacted, and the pressure from performance commitments was exposed. The capital arrangements originally signed to gain growth opportunities became pressures the company had to face. This is a common problem for companies in rapid growth stages. Each choice alone was reasonable. Financing was to survive. Expansion was to increase scale. Standardization was to improve efficiency. Sprinting to IPO was to gain greater development space. But when all these choices stack up, the company may gradually deviate from the core of the brand it originally built. For Xibei, the most important change may not be capital entering, but the growing gap between capital goals and consumer demands. Among the whole event, the most noteworthy is actually the employees. To strengthen the binding of interests between employees and the company, Xibei once promoted employees to participate in shareholding through loans. The logic was that if the company succeeded in going public, employees could share the benefits of growth. This arrangement is not uncommon in company development stages, aiming to make employees a community of interests. But the problem is, if the company develops smoothly, this is an incentive mechanism; if the company faces major risks, the pressure on employees becomes very real. When a business fails, the boss bears asset shrinkage and wealth loss. But for ordinary employees, if their investment involves loans, they may face long-term repayment pressure. Capital investment failure can be exited. A failed business owner can start anew, but ordinary employees face concrete life burdens. This is the most easily overlooked part of the entire Xibei incident. Much discussion focuses on the boss and capital, but few pay attention to the ordinary employees truly involved. Looking at consumers, they are also an important link in this chain. The pandemic caused cash flow pressure, leading companies to seek financing. Capital demands growth, companies push scale. Scale brings product model changes. Product changes affect consumer experience. Consumer trust declines, which in turn affects company valuation and capital plans. The whole process forms a complete chain. Xibei's problems were not caused by any one person. Luo Yonghao only made the problems more visible. What truly determines a company's direction is whether its long-term business logic can be sustained. No matter how large a catering company is, it ultimately must return to the consumer. Customers willing to pay keep the brand alive. Brand existence gives capital value. If a company constantly adjusts itself for capital goals but gradually loses consumer recognition, capital will eventually lose reasons to continue investing. Xibei's experience is a microcosm of many companies' development in recent years. The pandemic changed many companies' development paths. Some bosses became ordinary people looking for new jobs, some entrepreneurs entered new industries, some companies adjusted direction under pressure. Many are not lacking ability but face unprecedented problems in special cycles. Xibei is larger than many companies, so it can endure pressure longer and has more opportunities to adjust. But the final result it shows makes more people see a reality: after a company grows large, the hardest thing is not growth but maintaining its original intention during growth. In the business world, capital, employees, consumers, and managers each have their own interests and pressures. The real challenge is how to keep these interests balanced. Xibei's story is not over yet. But the issues left by this storm are worth all companies' reflection: what should a company truly pursue? Faster IPO or more stable operation? Higher valuation or stronger user trust? There is no simple answer. But one thing is clear: every company must ultimately face its users. Because what truly determines how far a company can go is not just the numbers on the capital ledger, but whether users are willing to keep choosing it.